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Defining the Parameters: When an ERISA Summary Plan
Description Trumps the Corresponding Plan Document
Megan Rose Bosau*
"Annual notices to employees are required for some laws, but a lot
of other important information about health care rights is buried in
what are called summary plan descriptions of benefits packages,
mounds of legalese about as readable as the package inserts in a
Tylenol box."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Roughly 78.6 million people in the United States work for compa-
nies that offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan.2 Seventy-nine
percent of these workers participate in the sponsored plans.3 Approxi-
mately $4.9 trillion in aggregate assets are held in trust by qualified
private retirement savings plans.4 Nearly 74% of Americans are also
covered by an employer- or union-sponsored group health care plan.5
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is
a federal law which regulates employer-provided pension and health
and welfare benefit plans in the United States. 6 The terms under
which an employer's health and welfare plans are administered are set
* Juris Doctor from DePaul University College of Law, anticipated 2009; Bachelor of Science
in Communication Studies and Spanish from Northwestern University, with honors, 2006. The
author would like to thank her parents, Robert and Rose Bosau, and her family for their endless
support and encouragement. The author would also like to thank Barry Kozak, Associate Direc-
tor Employee Benefits at the John Marshall Law School, Kevin Braden, and Lee Christoff for
their valuable comments on this Article.
1. Jennifer Steinhauer, MONEY & MEDICINE; Patient: Know Thy Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June
4, 2000, at 3-14.
2. EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, CHAPTER 1: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCriON (Mar. 22, 2009), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publi-
cations/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2001.pdf.
3. Id.
4. PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA IN THE COURTS 3 (Federal Judicial Center 2008). "That
extraordinary figure excludes $1.3 trillion in private pension plan assets held by life insurance
companies and more than $3.7 trillion held by deferred compensation plans covering govern-
ment workers [which are not governed by ERISA]." Id.
5. Id.
6. ERISA §§ 2-4402; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
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forth in a comprehensive manuscript known as a plan document. 7 Plan
documents detail the benefits available to a plan participant. 8 Pursu-
ant to ERISA, employers must furnish plan participants and benefi-
ciaries with a summary plan description (SPD). 9 The SPD must be
"written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan
participant [which is] . . .sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to
reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights
and obligations under the plan." 10
By definition, an SPD contains different language than the much
longer and comprehensive corresponding plan document. However,
problems arise when the SPD terms conflict with the plan document
provisions. The circuit courts are split regarding what elements an
ERISA claimant must establish to prevail on a claim for benefits
which the SPD seemingly allows but the plan document prohibits.
This Article explores an area of law which is currently subject to a
five-way circuit split-whether an ERISA claimant must establish reli-
ance and/or prejudice when the terms of an SPD conflict with the
more detailed terms of a plan document'-and argues the Supreme
Court should settle the confusion and unpredictability caused by the
differing standards.
Section II of this Article describes the background of ERISA, dis-
cusses SPD requirements and policy concerns, analyzes ways an SPD
can conflict with the underlying plan document, and summarizes the
remedies available to a claimant under ERISA.12 Section III explains
the five-way circuit split.1 3 Section IV analyzes the circuit split, argu-
ing the Supreme Court should adopt the Seventh 14 and Eleventh 5
7. ERISA § 3(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) defines "employee benefit plan" or "plan" to mean "an
employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an
employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan."
8. Consistent with ERISA § 3(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7), this Article uses "participant" to mean
"any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an
employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an
employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members of such organiza-
tion, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit" (emphasis added). An
"employee" is not necessarily a plan "participant" because ERISA defines "employee" as simply
"any individual employed by an employer." ERISA § 3(6); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6).
9. Consistent with ERISA § 3(8); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8), this Article uses the term "beneficiary"
to mean "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who
is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder."
10. ERISA § 102(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (emphasis added).
11. Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2007).
12. See infra Section II. A-D.
13. See infra Section III. A-E.




Circuits' standard that a beneficiary must prove reliance on an SPD
before they may benefit from advantageous SPD terms which conflict
with the corresponding plan document. 16
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, employee benefit plans were gov-
erned by a patchwork of federal and state laws; however, this sys-
tem-or lack thereof-ineffectively protected employees. 17 ERISA
was adopted in 1974 "in response to highly publicized instances of
fraud and mismanagement in employee pension funds, which had re-
sulted in thousands of workers losing retirement benefits accumulated
over a lifetime of work."' 18 Although ERISA was primarily intended
to regulate pensions, it also "applies to employee welfare benefit
plans, and thus covers employer provided health insurance, the domi-
nant vehicle for private finance of health care in the United States." 19
ERISA was designed to serve several interrelated goals including:
promoting equity for employees, increasing transparency and account-
ability in the operation of benefit plans, and improving the financial
security of retirees and their families.20 The statute established guide-
lines for the proper administration of employer pension and welfare
plans to ensure active employees and retirees received promised bene-
fits by securing plan assets.21 ERISA is important because once it ap-
plies, the statute contains broad preemption language which allows
the provisions to supersede most state laws. 22 Although ERISA does
15. Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992) (requiring showing of
reliance).
16. See infra Section IV. A-C.
17. See Sarah D. Burt, Pension Protection? A Comparative Analysis of Pension Reform in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 18 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 191-201 (2008) for a
brief history on employee benefits in the United States. See also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL,
EMPLOYMENT LAW 383 (3d ed. 2005) stating that "much of [ERISA's] legislative history dealt
with abuses in the administration and investment of private pension plans ... " "Not only did
ERISA 'solve' the pre-ERISA procedural difficulties in employee benefits litigation, but ERISA
also added some new law-new procedural requirements, and opportunities . . ." Frank Cum-
mings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major Claims, Defenses, and Remedies, SP024
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 943 (2008).
18. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 8-1, at 419 (2d ed. 2000).
19. Id.
20. Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 563, 574 (2006).
21. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997).
22. See ERISA § 514; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), providing that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) of this title [29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)] and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this
2009]
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not require employers to establish or maintain employee welfare or
pension benefit plans, employers who do must comply with specific
statutory requirements.23
ERISA works in tandem with the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)24
to encourage employers to develop employee benefit plans by provid-
ing preferential tax treatment for plans meeting ERISA require-
ments. 25 IRC provisions incentivize employers to voluntarily adopt
these plans-and thereby facilitate saving for workers' retirement-
because it makes no economic sense to operate a plan that forfeits the
tax advantages.26
The Department of Labor and the IRS administer ERISA. As part
and parcel of the supervision of plan administrators' compliance with
the law, ERISA requires several disclosures. These disclosures in-
clude: (1) an SPD; (2) a summary annual report (SAR); (3) a sum-
mary of material modifications (SMM); and (4) an annual report
(Form 5500).27 Of the foregoing disclosures, the SPD is the require-
ment most frequently discussed in employment litigation.28
B. SPD Requirements and Policy Concerns: The Competing Goals
of Clarity and Completeness
Pursuant to ERISA, the SPD must "be written in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be
sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the
plan."' 29 The document must describe the plan benefits and inform
title [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)]." "The term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations,
or other State action having the effect of law..." ERISA § 514(c)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
Consistent with ERISA § 514(c)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2), "[t]he term 'State' includes a State,
any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to
regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by
this subchapter." ERISA § 514(c)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2). "ERISA contains a preemption
provision of 'unparalleled breadth.' It bars state regulation of benefit plans even as to matters on
which ERISA is silent." ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 414.
23. ERISA §§ 2-3; 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
24. IRC §§ 1-9833.
25. United States General Accounting Office: Report to Congressional Requesters, PRI-
VATE PENSIONS Participants Need Information on Risks They Face in Managing Pension As-
sets at and during Retirement 6 (July 2003), available at http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/
documents/gao -03810.pdf.
26. "Pension tax preferences are structured to strike a balance between providing incentives
for employers to start and maintain voluntary, tax-qualified pension plans and ensuring partici-
pants receive an equitable share of the tax-favored benefits." Id.
27. ERISA §§ 101-104; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024. See also RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDER-
STANDINc EMPLOYMENT LAw 201 (LexisNexis 2007).
28. BALES, supra note 27, at 201.
29. ERISA § 102(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).
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participants of, among other things, eligibility requirements, proce-
dures for claiming plan benefits, the names and addresses of plan fidu-
ciaries, and obligations due under the plan.30 Employers must provide
employees with the SPD within ninety days of joining the plan.31
Unlike the comprehensive plan document it summarizes, the SPD is
intended to be the primary means by which plan participants are in-
formed about their benefits. 32 Written to be understood by an average
plan participant, an SPD cannot be comprehensive while also summa-
rizing and making the complex plan documents "intelligible (and
therefore useful) to the intended audience. ' '33 As one scholar has put
it:
30. ERISA § 102(b); 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). Specifically, the statute provides:
The summary plan description shall contain the following information: The name and
type of administration of the plan; in the case of a group health plan (as defined in
section 1191b(a)(1) of this title), whether a health insurance issuer (as defined in sec-
tion 1191b(b)(2) of this title) is responsible for the financing or administration (includ-
ing payment of claims) of the plan and (if so) the name and address of such issuer; the
name and address of the person designated as agent for the service of legal process, if
such person is not the administrator; the name and address of the administrator; names,
titles, and addresses of any trustee or trustees (if they are persons different from the
administrator); a description of the relevant provisions of any applicable collective bar-
gaining agreement; the plan's requirements respecting eligibility for participation and
benefits; a description of the provisions providing for nonforfeitable pension benefits;
circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of ben-
efits; the source of financing of the plan and the identity of any organization through
which benefits are provided; the date of the end of the plan year and whether the
records of the plan are kept on a calendar, policy, or fiscal year basis; the procedures to
be followed in presenting claims for benefits under the plan including the office at the
Department of Labor through which participants and beneficiaries may seek assistance
or information regarding their rights under this chapter and the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996 with respect to health benefits that are offered
through a group health plan (as defined in section 1191b(a)(1) of this title) and the
remedies available under the plan for the redress of claims which are denied in whole
or in part (including procedures required under section 1133 of this title).
Id.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1)(A). Beneficiaries must receive a copy of the SPD "within ninety
days after he first receives benefits." Id. There are little monetary sanctions for noncompliance
with the ERISA SPD requirements. If a sponsor ignores the SPD requirement, a participant or
beneficiary may make a written request for an SPD. If a sponsor fails to respond within thirty
days to the written request, the plan sponsor is penalized up to $110 per day until it complies.
WIEDENBECK, supra note 4, at 105, n.336.
32. See Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2003), stating that Congress intended the SPD to be "the
primary document on which plan participants must rely." "The SPD is intended to give partici-
pants accessible, reliable information concerning the plan, and to serve as their primary source
of information about the plan's terms." WIEDENBECK, supra note 4, at 82.
33. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 4, at 82, stating that because the SPD is "written to be un-
derstood by the average participant [it] cannot be completely accurate and comprehensive; it
need be only reasonably so, in recognition of the fact that generalizations and simplifications are
necessary to make the SPD intelligible (and therefore useful) to the intended audience."
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Benefit plan documents are complex legal instruments, often run-
ning over thirty pages in length, the precise meaning of which can
only be determined by giving scrupulous attention to a set of de-
fined terms, and following up a large number of internal cross-refer-
ences. To be useful to its intended audience of participants and
beneficiaries, the SPD must summarize by simplifying and omitting
detail.3 4
Accordingly, several courts have been quick to point out the two com-
peting goals in drafting an SPD: clarity and completeness. 35
C. Situations in Which a Participant May Claim the SPD and Plan
Document Conflict
An SPD necessarily contains different language than the (much
longer) comprehensive corresponding plan document. However, there
are at least three categories of SPDs where this different language
may lead to disputes: (1) inaccurate SPDs (in which SPD and plan
document provisions conflict); (2) self-contradictory SPDs; and (3) in-
complete SPDs.
The majority of courts agree that when the SPD is more favorable
to a participant than the plan term with which it directly conflicts, the
favorable SPD provision controls.36 This result generally makes sense
because ERISA contemplates that "employees will depend on the
SPD, and if the Plan Documents are allowed to supersede, then the
SPD is useless."' 37 However, courts and scholars debate what specifi-
cally ERISA claimants must establish to achieve this favorable result.
If the SPD is self-contradictory, courts generally hold that a per-
son's reliance on the defective SPD is unjustified. 38 Although ERISA
34. Id. at 96.
35. See Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d
1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Clarity and completeness are competing goods."); Lorenzen v. Em-
ployees Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he plan
summary is not required to anticipate every possible idiosyncratic contingency that might affect
a particular participant's or beneficiary's status.... If it were, the summaries would be choked
with detail and hopelessly confusing. Clarity and completeness are competing goods."); Mattias
v. Computer Sciences Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 120, 125 (D.R.I. 1999) ("The problem is that clarity
and completeness are competing goals.").
36. WIEDENBECK, supra note 4, at 82-83. "There is nearly unanimous agreement in the case
law that the purposes of disclosure demand that the SPD have controlling legal effect in the
event it conflicts with the terms of the plan, notwithstanding a disclaimer clause." Id. See also
Burstein, 334 F.3d at 376-79.
37. Mattias, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 125. It has also been recognized that "[t]he SPD is the document
to which the lay employee is likely to refer in obtaining information about the plan and in mak-
ing decisions affected by the terms of the plan." Burstein, 334 F.3d at 379.
38. WIEDENBECK, supra note 4, at 88. "If a reasonable participant's careful reading of the




does not provide clear guidance on the issue of an incomplete SPD-
for example, when the SPD is silent on an issue addressed in the plan
document, or when the SPD uses a term only defined in the plan doc-
ument-most courts addressing the issue have held the plan document
controls because "an inference based on the SPD's silence cannot
override more specific provisions in the underlying instruments. 39
Although the aforementioned patterns reflect the majority ap-
proach, circuit court holdings greatly differ, as demonstrated below.40
D. Remedies Available Under ERISA
To understand the importance of the five-way circuit split regarding
the appropriate standard of reliance a claimant must establish to pre-
vail on a claim when an SPD conflicts with the terms of the underlying
plan document, it is necessary to understand how the distinctions-
some combination of reliance, prejudice, or nothing at all-affect the
available remedies. Plan participants may turn to three principal
places for relief in civil actions under ERISA: Section 502(a)(1)(B),
Section 502(a)(2), and Section 502(a)(3). 41
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a participant or beneficiary
may sue "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan."'42 However, "[i]f the
misleading SPD merely describes but does not itself comprise 'the
plan,' then a suit for benefits... will fail, for the terms of the plan as
set forth in the plan documents have not been breached. Conse-
quently, instead of enforcing the plan, recovery is limited to 'appropri-
ate equitable relief'. ..
39. Id. at 94.
40. See infra Section III. A-E.
41. Thomas G. Moukawsher, Being in the Zone: A Plaintiffs View of ERISA Participant
Standing for Former Employees, ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: ERISA LITI-
CATION E-12 (Nov. 1-2, 2007).
A fourth potential remedy is an action under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A) for relief under ERISA
§ 502(c)(1)(B) for a plan administrator's failure or refusal to comply with a participant's or bene-
ficiary's request for information to which he is entitled.
Several of ERISA's other subsections are "only rarely, if ever, invoked in litigation" and thus
they are outside the scope of this Article. See Maria O'Brien Hylton & Dana M. Muir, ERISA
REMEDIES: Background Materials and Update 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.bna.com/
bnabooks/ababna/annual/2004/hylton.doc.
42. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
43. WIEDENBECK, supra note 4, at 86 (emphasis added). If a claimant need not establish reli-
ance on the SPD, then, like a contract, the SPD is enforced because it sets forth the principal
terms of the plan itself. If, however, a claimant must establish reliance, then the SPD may govern
as a matter of estoppel. Id.
2009]
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ERISA § 502(a)(2) allows the Secretary of Labor, plan participants,
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries to bring an action for "appropriate relief
under [ERISA § 409]" on behalf of the plan.44 Section 409 provides
the following:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
[his or her fiduciary duty] shall be personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and
to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary...45
The Supreme Court has interpreted congressional intent and severely
limited the relief available under ERISA § 502(a)(2). Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell held that ERISA § 502(a)(2)
does not create a private right of action for a single plan participant to
seek recovery for damages payable directly to him or her; such relief is
limited to the benefit of the plan only.46 Accordingly, Section
502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries that are
distinct from plan injuries.4 7
ERISA § 502(a)(3) allows plan participants, beneficiaries, and fidu-
ciaries to "enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or ... to obtain other appro-
priate equitable relief... 48 Interpreting congressional intent, the Su-
preme Court has also severely limited the relief available under
Section 502(a)(3). Mertens v. Hewitt Associates held that "appropriate
equitable relief" under ERISA § 502(a)(3) only authorizes courts to
give plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries relief typically
available in equity, not compensatory damages.49
44. ERISA § 502(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) provides that a civil action may be brought by
"the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section
409 [29 USCS § 1109]."
45. ERISA § 409(a); 29 USC § 1109(a) (emphasis added).
46. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985). "Petitioner contends, how-
ever, that recovery for a violation of § 409 inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole. We find
this contention supported by the text of § 409, by the statutory provisions defining the duties of a
fiduciary, and by the provisions defining the rights of a beneficiary." Id. at 140. "[T]he relevant
text of ERISA, the structure of the entire statute, and its legislative history all support the con-
clusion that in § 409(a) Congress did not provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply, a
cause of action for extra-contractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of
benefit claims." Id. at 148.
47. Cf. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 (2008) (holding that
"although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan inju-
ries, that provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan
assets in a participant's individual account").
48. ERISA § 502(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
49. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) stating that remedies traditionally
viewed as equitable include injunctive relief and restitution. The compensatory damages which
petitioners sought, however, is the classic form of legal relief. Equitable relief has previously
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In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, the Su-
preme Court further limited the recovery available under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) by refusing to permit an insurance company's subrogation
claim. 50 In Great-West, petitioners brought a claim seeking to recover
money due under the terms of a contract. 51 The petitioners attempted
to characterize the relief sought as equitable, alternatively arguing
that they were seeking injunctive relief (to enforce the terms of the
contract) or restitution. 52 In considering the matter, the Supreme
Court reiterated its statement in Mertens:
'Equitable' relief must mean something less than all relief' ... Thus,
in Mertens we rejected a reading of the statute that would extend
the relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to whatever relief a court of
equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at issue
(which could include legal remedies that would otherwise be be-
yond the scope of the equity court's authority).53
Accordingly, the Court refused to grant the legal relief petitioners
sought, reaffirming its strict adherence to the plain language of ER-
ISA, a statute the Court described as "comprehensive and
reticulated. 54
As the foregoing cases make clear, little relief is available for indi-
vidual ERISA claimants. Thus, the five-way circuit split must be con-
sidered with a seemingly principal policy goal in mind-containing
employee benefit plan costs so employers continue to develop and
maintain these plans for the benefit of participating workers.
III. THE FIVE-WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT
We certainly do not write on a clean slate. Indeed, there appears to
be a five-way circuit split regarding whether an ERISA claimant
needs to establish reliance and/or prejudice based on the conflicting
terms of an SPD.55
When courts are faced with the decision whether to enforce the
terms of an SPD which conflict with the terms of a plan document, the
been construed to preclude awards for both compensatory and punitive damages. See United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992).
50. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 210-12. Additionally, "the United States, as petitioners amicus, argues that the com-
mon law of trusts provides petitioners with equitable remedies that allow them to bring this
action under § 502(a)(3). Analogizing respondents to beneficiaries of a trust, the United States
argues that a trustee could bring a suit to enforce an agreement by a beneficiary to pay money
into a trust or to repay an advance made from the trust .... These trust remedies are simply
inapposite." Id. at 219.
53. Id. at 209-10.
54. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209.
55. Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458, n.1 (5th Cir. 2007).
2009]
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favorable SPD provisions generally control. However, courts differ re-
garding what specifically a claimant must show for the favorable SPD
provisions to control. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals56 recently
noted the split over this issue can be broken down five ways between
courts which: (1) do not require a showing of reliance;57 (2) do not
require a showing of reliance but require a showing of a likelihood of
prejudice (which can be rebutted by evidence showing the error was
harmless); 58 (3) require a showing of either reliance or prejudice;5 9 (4)
require a showing of reliance or prejudice, but only if the SPD is
"faulty; ' 60 or (5) simply require a showing of reliance.61 Each of these
standards is discussed below.
A. No Showing of Reliance is Necessary: Fifth, Third, and Sixth
Circuits' Approach
In Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., a terminated employee
seeking disability pension benefits under ERISA brought an action
against his employer. 62 The employee, who had eight years of service
at the company, sought disability benefits under the employer's pen-
sion plan, which required ten years of service for the disability pension
to vest. 63 However, the SPD stated the benefits vested after the com-
pletion of only five years of service.64
The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the employee's
favor and held that when the terms of an SPD and plan document
conflict, "the terms of the conflicting SPD unequivocally grant the em-
ployee with a vested right to benefits, the employee need not show
reliance or prejudice. '65
In addressing whether the plaintiff needed to establish reliance on
the SPD or prejudice based on the conflicting SPD and plan terms, the
56. Id.
57. Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 380-82 (3d Cir. 2003); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d
134, 137 (6th Cir. 1988).
58. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2003).
59. Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996); Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys.
Corp., 13 F.3d 138,141 (4th Cir. 1993); Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union,
Local No. 5 Pension Fund, 732 F.2d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 1984).
60. Palmisano v. Allina Health Sys., 190 F.3d 881, 887-88 (8th Cir. 1999); Marolt v. Alliant
Techsystems, 146 F.3d 617, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1998).
61. Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 1999); Branch v. G.
Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (lth Cir. 1992).
62. Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 454 (2007).
63. Id. at 455.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
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court primarily relied on its prior decision in Hansen v. Continental
Insurance Co., 6 6 and the Third Circuit's decision in Burstein v. Retire-
ment Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Education &
Research Foundation, discussed further below. 67
In Hansen, the court analogized ERISA SPDs to insurance contract
law and held:
[Tihe summary plan description is binding,... if there is a conflict
between the summary plan description and the terms of the policy,
the summary plan description shall govern. Any other rule would
be, as the Congress recognized, grossly unfair to employees and
would undermine ERISA's requirement of an accurate and compre-
hensive summary .... the ambiguity in the summary plan descrip-
tion must be resolved in favor of the employee and made binding
against the drafter.68
The Fifth Circuit found its approach to reliance consistent with ER-
ISA, which the court stated was "designed to protect employees," and
with its own opinion in Hansen, which the court stated "refused to
place the burden of conflicting SPDs on plan beneficiaries. '69
In Burstein, five former employees of the bankrupt Allegheny
Health Education and Research Foundation, sought benefits they be-
lieved had accrued through the corporation's Retirement Account
Plan prior to the bankruptcy filing.70 The retirement plan document
provided that rights to benefits accrued as of the date of the plan's
total or partial termination became nonforfeitable "to the extent
funded as of such date."'71 However, the SPD stated that if the plan
was terminated, participants "automatically become vested" in their
account, regardless of their years of service. 72
66. Hansen v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991).
67. Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 380-82 (3d Cir. 2003).
68. Hansen, 940 F.2d at 982.
69. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d at 459.
70. Burstein, 334 F.3d at 368. The corporation was not required by ERISA to fund accounts
for participants who had not yet met the five-year service requirement. Id. at 375. The plan in
question was a defined benefit, cash balance pension plan under ERISA. Id. at 370. "Under a
cash balance plan... if the plan terminates, 'it is possible that the plan will be underfunded as to
some or all of the participants.' . . . ERISA does not require that the cash-balance plan sponsor
fund the plan fully for all participants; rather, it only requires that these plans be funded for
those participants whose benefits had vested prior to the plan's (partial) termination. Burstein
has not claimed that AHERF failed to fund the Plan in accordance with these minimum stan-
dards." Id. at 370-71. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082 for ERISA's minimum funding standards. See also 26
U.S.C. § 412 for the IRC's minimum funding standards for a plan's qualification for preferential
tax treatment.
71. Burstein, 334 F.3d at 380.
72. Id.
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The Third Circuit held that the participants need not plead or prove
reliance or prejudice when the SPD terms conflict with the plan docu-
ment itself and thus the employees had stated a claim against the Re-
tirement Account Plan.73 Analogizing a claim for plan benefits under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to contract law, the court reasoned that en-
forcement of contracts does not require the contracting parties to
even read, and therefore rely upon, the particular contract's terms.74
The court found this should be true for SPDs as well.
The Third Circuit recently limited the Burstein holding in Hooven v.
Exxon Mobil Corp. In Hooven, former Mobil employees were termi-
nated following the Exxon-Mobil merger.75 After the merger was an-
nounced, Mobil distributed an initial SPD to its employees. The
district court found that, unlike Mobil's formal Change-in-Control Re-
tention/Severance Plan (CIC Plan), the corresponding initial SPD
'failed to advise Plaintiffs that they would be ineligible for severance
in the event of a divestiture' 76-even though Mobil had already dis-
tributed a second SPD clearing up the mistake.77 Relying on Burstein,
the district court determined that since the terms of the SPD and the
CIC Plan differed, the terms of the SPD should control.78 The court
ordered Exxon to provide the employees with severance benefits due
under the terms of the SPD.79
On appeal, the Third Circuit distinguished Burstein as a situation
where, "[biased on the terms of the SPD, all of the conditions prece-
dent to [the employees'] receipt of such benefits had been satisfied. 80
Unlike Burstein, where the SPD purporting to vest the plaintiffs' ben-
efits was in effect when the plaintiffs' benefits actually vested, the sev-
erance benefits in Hooven did not arise when the initial SPD was still
in effect. 81 Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed stating:
[T]he starting point for Plaintiffs' claim is ERISA, not the common
law of contracts. Under this framework, Plaintiffs' rights to benefits
under the Initial SPD never became due .... [t]he plan documents
73. Id. at 380-82. "If an SPD conflicts with a plan document, then a court should read the
terms of the 'contract' to include the terms of a plan document, as superseded and modified by
conflicting language in the SPD." Id. at 381.
74. Id.
75. Hooven v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 2006).
76. Id. at 570.
77. Id. at 578.
78. Id. at 572.
79. Id.




that were in effect when Plaintiffs' claim to benefits would have ac-
crued clearly establish that they are ineligible for severance. 82
In Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Sixth Circuit considered a former employee's claim to disability bene-
fits.8 3 The retirement plan granted benefits to those who satisfied the
following prerequisite: "The sum of the member's attained age and
the length of his credited service must be at least 55 years prior to his
date of disablement." 84
The employer provided its employees with a summary instead of
the entire plan document.85 This summary stated that time while on
sick leave counts as service for plan membership, vesting, and retire-
ment income.86 The plaintiff-appellee was a forty-year-old, long-time
employee of State Farm who became permanently disabled following
a surgical procedure to remove a brain tumor.87 Unable to return to
work, the employee received a letter three months into his sick leave
informing him that he had already qualified or would qualify for disa-
bility income based on the summary provision previously provided to
the plaintiff.88
Two hundred days into his sick leave-having accumulated what he
believed was a sufficient amount of time to enable him to qualify for
disability benefits under the plan-the employee filed a claim for disa-
bility benefits. Only if the 200 sick leave days were credited to his
length of service would the plaintiff-appellee satisfy the disability ben-
efits requirement. 89 However, a provision in the plan document de-
fined the date of disablement as the first workday an employee did
not report to work because of total disability.90 Accordingly, the plan
administrator denied the plaintiff's claim because the employee had
not met the necessary length of service to receive disability benefits.91
82. Id. at 569. "It is one thing to acknowledge that contract principles apply in ERISA cases.
Clearly, they do. Generally, 'breach of contract principles, applied as a matter of federal law,
govern' claims for benefits due under an ERISA plan.... However, it is quite another to say
that an employee's severance benefit can be grounded in, and enforceable based on, a unilateral
contract outside of ERISA's remedial scheme. Although this approach is intuitively appealing,
and seemingly appropriate in this complex area, we conclude that it is inconsistent with the basic
framework of ERISA and, therefore, cannot be." Id. at 572-73.
83. Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir. 1988).
84. Id. at 135.
85. Id. at 136.
86. Id. at 135-36.
87. Id. at 137 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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Although the participant had reasonably relied on the summary, the
Sixth Circuit found "existing precedent does not dictate that a claim-
ant who has been misled by summary descriptions must prove detri-
mental reliance. Congress has promulgated clear directives
prohibiting misleading summary descriptions. This court elects not to
undermine the legislative command by imposing technical require-
ments upon the employee. '92 Accordingly, the statements in the sum-
mary were binding notwithstanding the participant's reliance.93 The
dissent noted the case was a "classic example of the maxim that hard
cases make bad law." 94
B. No Showing of Reliance is Necessary, but Must Show a
Likelihood of Prejudice: Second Circuit's Approach
In Burke v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan, the Second Circuit for
the first time proclaimed the court's standard on whether detrimental
reliance or prejudice is required to recover in cases of faulty SPDs. 95
The court held that requiring plan participants or beneficiaries to
show detrimental reliance to recover for a deficient SPD contravened
ERISA's objective of promoting distribution of accurate SPDs to
employees. 96
Plaintiff brought a claim against the Retirement Income Plan Ad-
ministrators of her deceased husband's employer, the Eastman Kodak
Company (Kodak), for denying her survivor income benefits (SIB). 9 7
Plaintiff and her husband were married for less than six months when
he passed away.98 However, prior to their marriage, plaintiff and the
decedent lived together for eight years as domestic partners. 99 The
employee handbook and sixteen separate sections of the SPD explic-
itly required domestic partners to file joint affidavits if they wished to
be eligible for various types of benefits, but the SIB section failed to
mention this requirement. 100 In the two to three years prior to the
decedent's death, Kodak had advertised the benefits available to do-
mestic partners in an Employee Benefits Newsletter and a Benefits
92. Id. at 137.
93. Edwards, 851 F.2d at 136 (citing Rhoton v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw., 717 F.2d 988, 989-91
(6th Cir. 1983)).
94. Id. at 137.
95. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
96. Id. at 106.
97. Id. at 105.
98. Id. at 106.
99. Id.
100. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d at 106.
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Update.1 01 The record demonstrated the plaintiff and her husband
had consciously decided for eight years not to apply for domestic part-
nership status for Kodak's health care benefits because of concerns
that the plaintiff would not be covered due to a pre-existing illness.102
The Second Circuit held that the decedent and his beneficiary, de-
spite not having read the SPD, were likely prejudiced as a result of it
because the specific SIB section failed to mention the affidavit re-
quirement noted in sixteen other sections of the SPD.10 3 Furthermore,
Kodak failed to demonstrate that this error would have been harm-
less. 104 Thus, the case was remanded with instructions to enter judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff.10 5
C. Must Show Reliance or Prejudice: First, Fourth, and Tenth
Circuits' Approach
The First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits employ a disjunctive test, re-
quiring claimants to show they either relied on, or were prejudiced by,
the SPD. In Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers International
Union, Local No. 5 Pension Fund, the appellant claimed he was enti-
tled to a larger pension by arguing that his break in service from the
company between March of 1962 and October of 1966 fell outside the
"break in service" definition found in the pension plan.10 6 The First
Circuit stated that to secure relief, the appellant "must show some
significant reliance upon, or possible prejudice flowing from, the
faulty plan description.' 0 7
The court held that although the SPD available to the appellant
failed to inform him that plan participants with pre-1976 breaks would
be treated harsher than those with breaks after 1976, the petitioner
did not detrimentally rely on this. 10 8 The court reasoned that the only
conceivable prejudice was the petitioner's decision to retire early,
which the court dismissed by noting that early retirement was a revo-
cable decision.10 9 Furthermore, the appellant was informed about the
101. Id.
102. Id. at 114.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 113.
105. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d at 115.
106. Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union, Local No. 5 Pension Fund, 732
F.2d 250, 250-51 (1st Cir. 1984).
107. Id. at 252 (citing Hillis v. Waukesha Title Co., 576 F. Supp. 1103, 1109-10 (E.D. Wis.
1983); Morse v. Stanley, 566 F. Supp. 1455, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F.
Supp. 606, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); affd, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980)).
108. Id. at 253.
109. Id.
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break in service rule two days prior to his retirement and could have
changed his retirement decision upon receiving this notification. 110
In Aiken v. Policy Management Systems Corp., the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court decision and held the plan document terms
controlled over the SPD. 111 Quoting earlier precedent, the court reit-
erated that the SPD is the 'employee's primary source of information
regarding employment benefits."1 2 Accordingly, 'if there was a con-
flict between the complexities of the plan's language and the simple
language of the SPD, the latter would control.' 3
In Aiken, the plaintiff resigned from his company following sexual
harassment allegations. 114 He claimed he was entitled to a lump-sum
distribution of his vested pension benefits pursuant to a provision in
the SPD, which facially entitled the plaintiff to the requested distribu-
tion.1 15 However, the plan document stated he was not eligible for the
specific benefits until he turned Sixty. 16
Quoting Govoni, the Fourth Circuit stated that '[t]o secure relief,
[the claimant] must show some significant reliance upon, or possible
prejudice flowing from, the faulty plan description.' 7 The Fourth Cir-
cuit specifically adopted the disjunctive test from Govoni: a plaintiff
must prove reliance on the SPD or prejudice in order to recover.118
The case was remanded for further proceedings. 119
110. Id. at 252.
111. Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 139 (4th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 140 (quoting Pierce v. Security Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1992)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 139.
115. Id. Specifically, the provision stated, "[a] participant may take early retirement after age
60 and the completion of 20 years of service or upon completion of 25 years of service without
regard to participant's age. If a participant terminates employment after completing 20 years of
service but before attaining age 60, the participant is entitled to distribution of the vested interest in
the Plan. The participant may elect to defer the distribution until normal retirement age." Aiken,
13 F.3d at 140 (emphasis added).
116. Id. "[T]he official Plan document provided that distribution of vested benefits under the
applicable provision only occurred 'upon satisfaction of said age requirement."' Id.
117. Id. at 141 (quoting Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union, Local No. 5
Pension Fund, 732 F.2d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 1984)).
118. Id. The district court had applied Govoni; however, it interpreted Govoni as requiring an
ERISA claimant to prove reliance on the SPD and resulting prejudice in order to recover (a
conjunctive construction of the reliance or prejudice test as opposed to the proper disjunctive test
of reliance or prejudice). Aiken, 13 F.3d at 141.
119. Id. at 142. "The district court found that Aiken had failed to demonstrate reliance and
prejudice because under its construction of Aiken's reading of the SPD, he would have been
entitled to benefits regardless of whether he resigned or was fired." Id. at 141. However, the case
was remanded because the district court's finding of prejudice and reliance were bound up to-
gether. Id. at 142.
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In Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., the plaintiffs were former employees of
a division of Control Data which was sold to another company.120
Prior to the sale, each plaintiff was receiving long-term disability ben-
efits under the Control Data Long Term Disability Plan (LTD
Plan). 121 The SPD to the plan provided that while the participants re-
mained on long-term disability status, "the company will pay the pre-
miums for all the company-sponsored benefits (medical, life, and
dental) for which you and your dependents were enrolled before your
disability began... until you and your dependents are no longer eligi-
ble for the plans."'21 2 However, the SPD allowed for the plan to be
amended as the company deemed it 'advisable."123 The SPD also
noted the company reserved the right to terminate the plan 'at any
time."124
When the company informed the employees receiving long-term
disability benefits that the plan was going to be amended (to require
the plaintiffs to pay the same premiums as the active employees), 25
the plaintiffs brought suit, claiming the SPD for the LTD Plan consti-
tuted an enforceable promise to pay the disabled employees' health
care premiums as long as they remained disabled. 126
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated the mere demonstration that an
SPD is inconsistent with the LTD Plan did not inherently entitle the
plaintiffs to any sort of recovery. 127 The court remanded so each indi-
vidual plaintiff could have the opportunity to show some sort of rea-
sonable reliance on the SPD or prejudice flowing from the
inconsistency. 128 In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit quoted
Govoni and Aiken, stating:
The mere demonstration that the SPD is inconsistent with the terms
outlined in the LTD Plan itself does not entitle plaintiffs to the ben-
efits they believe vested upon termination. Where the SPD incor-
rectly described benefits in the plan, 'to secure relief, [the claimant]
must show some significant reliance upon, or possible prejudice
flowing from, the faulty plan description. 1 29
120. Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1509.
124. Id.
125. Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1509.
126. Id.
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The court reasoned that the reliance or prejudice requirement made
sense in light of the purpose of the SPD. 130 Holding otherwise would
allow a windfall for some employees while unjustly increasing employ-
ers' and insurers' costs, 13 1 which would ultimately jeopardize a plan's
solvency to the detriment of all employees. 132
D. Must Show Reliance or Prejudice, but only if the SPD is
"Faulty:" Eighth Circuit's Approach
In Marolt v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., the Eighth Circuit considered.
whether a plaintiff could "bridge" her service to a company for pur-
poses of dating her employment-and thereby increase her retirement
benefits-according to a provision in the company's SPD.133 This pro-
vision allowed participants to back-date their employment to an ear-
lier, pre-break date under certain circumstances. 134
The claimant in Marolt worked for the employer's parent company
prior to the employer's spinoff.135 Before she accepted her new posi-
tion with the spinoff company, the claimant was informed she could
"bridge" her break in service-which would increase her retirement
benefits.136 It was unclear whether the claimant ever read the SPD;
she relied on her supervisor and the Location Benefits Administra-
tor's assurances that her break in service would be bridged. 137
Addressing the company's claim that the claimant must prove she
detrimentally relied on the SPD, the Eighth Circuit reiterated the fol-
lowing rule:
[T]o secure relief on the basis of a faulty summary plan description,
the claimant must show some significant reliance on, or possible
prejudice flowing from the summary. 138. .. A faulty summary plan
description is one that fails to meet 'the requirements of ERISA
and its attendant regulations. 1 39
130. Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1519. The court stated the purpose of the SPD is "to give employees an
understanding of the plan upon which they are entitled to rely; the master plan document, how-
ever, is also relevant to determine what the terms of the plan actually are." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.





138. Marot, 146 F.3d at 621 (citing Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th
Cir. 1992)).




Here, however, the SPD in question met ERISA's requirements-so
it was not "faulty"-and the claimant never argued the SPD was
faulty. 140 Thus a different rule applied; when the SPD terms conflict
with the plan terms, the provisions in the SPD govern as a matter of
law.141
The Eighth Circuit reasoned the rule was designed to prevent ER-
ISA claimants from being "sandbagged" by after-the-fact interpreta-
tions of the plan provisions, which might be done for purposes of
litigation.142 However, if the SPD was faulty, then the claimant would
have had to show "some significant reliance on, or possible prejudice
flowing from the summary" in order to secure relief. 143
In Palmisano v. Allina Health Systems, another Eighth Circuit deci-
sion, the defendant corporation fired the claimant for failing to ade-
quately respond to fraudulent billing allegations. 144 The corporation's
predecessor company had provided the claimant with a copy of its
"Plan Book," which described the company's employee benefit plans,
including the severance benefit at issue.1 45 The Plan Book stated exec-
utives would receive severance "[iln the event of involuntary termina-
tion without cause. 1 46 However, the company's formal severance
plans defined eligible employees as those 'terminated by the Em-
ployer because his or her position has been eliminated.' 147
Relying on Marolt, the participant in Palmisano claimed the SPD
plan terms prevailed as a matter of law. 148 However, the participant
also contended the SPD was "faulty."'1 49 The Eighth Circuit defines a
"faulty" SPD as one which does not meet the requirements of ERISA,
as laid out in 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a), (b). 150 Here, however, the SPD
could not even be deemed "faulty"-it contained only a mistaken
description of the plan's eligibility requirements and none of the other
information required by ERISA. 151 Therefore, the reliance or possible
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 620.
143. Marolt, 146 F.3d at 621 (quoting Maxa, 972 F.2d at 984).
144. Palmisano v. Allina Health Sys., 190 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 886.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 887.
148. Id.
149. Palnisano, 190 F.3d at 889.
150. Id. at 888-89.
151. Id. at 888. The SPD did not contain "the name and type of the plan; the name and
address of the agent for service of process; the name and address of the plan administrator; the
plan's eligibility requirements; circumstances which may result in denial or loss of benefits; the
source of the plan's financing; the plan year; and claim procedures and remedies available for
redress of denied claims." Id.
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prejudice flowing from a faulty SPD test did not even apply. Regard-
less of whether the participant relied upon the conflicting Plan Book
definition of eligibility, the terms of the formal severance plans con-
trolled. 152 The company violated ERISA by failing to provide an SPD
describing its benefit plans, but the claimant failed to assert a claim for
a disclosure violation153
In Greeley v. Fairview Health Services, the Eighth Circuit again
stated that to obtain relief when a faulty SPD conflicts with the plan
document, a participant must show he "relied on its terms to his detri-
ment. ' 154 Detrimental reliance involves showing the following:
[T]he plaintiff took action, resulting in some detriment, that he
would not have taken had he known that the terms of the plan were
otherwise or that he failed, to his detriment, to take action that he
would have taken had he known that the terms of the plans were
otherwise. 155
A single typographical error in a memo attached to an SPD indicated
the long-term disability benefits expired at age sixty-seven.' 56 The
SPD did not contradict this statement, but the plan document pro-
vided the benefits expired at age sixty-five.1 57 The Eighth Circuit re-
versed the district court holding that a participant "was likely to have
been harmed by a deficient SPD."'158 The plaintiff had not offered any
evidence suggesting prejudice-that "he changed his course of action
or otherwise relied on the faulty SPD."'1 59 Accordingly, the participant
could not recover for the faulty SPD.
E. Must Show Reliance: Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' Approach
In the Seventh Circuit, the existence of an SPD does not eviscerate
the underlying policy of a plan.' 60 If a discrepancy exists between an
SPD and the underlying policy, the terms of the SPD do not always
control.16' Seventh Circuit courts follow this rule under the following
two circumstances: (1) the underlying policy clarifies, rather than con-
152. Id.
153. Palmisano, 190 F.3d at 888-89.
154. Greeley v. Fairview Health Servs., 479 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 2007).
155. Id. (quoting Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992)).
156. Id. at 613.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 614 (quoting Greeley v. Fairview Health Servs., 2006 WL 1851132, 3-4N (2006)).
159. Greeley, 479 F.3d at 615 (quoting Greeley, 2006 WL 1851132, at 3).
160. Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014,
1021-22 (7th Cir. 1998).
161. Id. at 1022.
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tradicts, the summary; and (2) the SPD is silent on an issue that is
described in the underlying policy. 162
In Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Washington, the Seventh Circuit
considered a suit brought by Health Cost Controls seeking reimburse-
ment of certain benefits the plan paid defendant, a participant in an
employer-sponsored welfare plan.163 The plan paid defendant's medi-
cal expenses after she was injured in a car accident with an uninsured
motorist.164 However, the defendant also obtained $60,000 ($10,580.15
of which was for medical expenses) from an insurance policy provid-
ing uninsured motorist benefits. 165
The plan document stated that the plan covered the expense of
"medical services for injury caused by a third party... However, [the
plan] has the right to be reimbursed for the value of services it has
provided when a beneficiary receives payment from a third party."'1 66
The SPD clumsily paraphrased this language, stating that the plan
"will provide medical services and treatment for injuries caused by a
third party. You must, however, assign to the [plan] all rights to ob-
taining reimbursement from the third party for medical services pro-
vided by or through the [plan]."'1 67
The provision was intended to prevent double payment and avoid a
windfall to the plan participant. Read literally, however, the SPD im-
plied the plan could only seek reimbursement from a third party caus-
ing the injury. In Health Cost Controls, the third party causing the
injury was an uninsured motorist, not the insurance company paying
the defendant's uninsured-motorist benefits.168
The Seventh Circuit reiterated the principle that when a plan docu-
ment and SPD conflict, the former governs because it is more com-
plete and the SPD is excerpting and translating language designed to
be intelligible to a lay person "unless the plan participant or benefici-
ary has reasonably relied on the summary plan description to his
detriment."'69
162. Id. at 1023.
163. Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1999).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 711.
167. Id.
168. Health Cost Controls, Inc., 187 F.3d at 711.
169. Id. (citing Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144
F.3d 1014, 1022-24 (7th Cir. 1998); Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050,
1051 (7th Cir. 1991); Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1996); Aiken v.
Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added)).
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Here, however, the Seventh Circuit found there was no conflict. 170
The defendant's interpretation of the summary plan description was
senseless and the provision's purpose was clear. 171 "The quoted lan-
guage is merely a clumsy paraphrase of the clear language of the plan
itself. Senseless interpretations of ERISA summary plan descriptions
as of other contractual documents should be rejected. ' 172
In Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., another Sev-
enth Circuit decision, the administrator of a decedent's estate filed for
recovery on the decedent's life insurance policy. 173 The decedent's life
insurance policy stated that her beneficiaries could only recover if the
decedent died accidentally. 74 The decedent died in the hospital while
being treated for Crohn's disease; her death was caused by a loose
feeding tube which moved and punctured her heart.175 The insurance
carrier denied recovery on the life insurance policy because the dece-
dent's death was not an accident, rather it stemmed from her ill-
ness. 176 The SPD referred to the insurance policy for details, and the
policy expressly excluded 'sickness or disease' and 'medical or surgical
treatment of a sickness or disease."177
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court decision that death
resulting from medical malpractice is not "accidental" within the ac-
cepted meaning of the word. 178 According to the Seventh Circuit, it
made no difference that the decedent never received the policy (only
the SPD) because receiving the policy is not an ERISA require-
ment. 179 ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) entitles participants to rely on
SPDs, and if the participant does so, the plan is estopped from deny-
ing coverage. 180 However, that is only the case when the SPD and plan
document conflict; here, there was no contradiction between the SPD
and the policy-the policy simply clarified the SPD.' 8'
170. Id. at 712.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 163 F.3d 411, 420 (7th Cir. 1998); Delgrosso v.
Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 936 (3d Cir. 1985)).
173. Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1050.
177. Id. at 1051.
178. Senkier, 948 F.2d at 1054.
179. Id. at 1051. Under ERISA § 104(B)(4), participants and beneficiaries may always re-






Eleventh Circuit decisions are consistent with this approach. In
Branch v. G. Bernd Co., the administrator of a decedent's estate
brought suit to recover health insurance benefits from a life insurance
company the decedent received as an employee of the G. Bernd Com-
pany. 182 The decedent resigned his employment after the company im-
plemented a new drug testing policy. 183 Advised of his COBRA right,
the decedent signed an election form. Instead of accepting or declin-
ing continued coverage for himself, the decedent, who was without
dependents, checked a box indicating an election to decline continued
coverage for dependents. 184
Days later, the decedent was admitted to the hospital after being
shot several times. He died, leaving the hospital with unpaid medical
bills approaching $100,000 and an incomplete COBRA election
form.185 Consistent with the minimum requirements of COBRA, G.
Bernd Company's Employee Welfare Benefit Plan (the Plan) ex-
pressly provided for a sixty day election period.186 However, the SPD
stated the election period was only thirty-one days.187
Given that ERISA contemplates the SPD is an employee's primary
source of information regarding benefits and employees are entitled
to rely on them,188 the Eleventh Circuit stated the following:
[W]hen an employer provides an inaccurate plan summary, the ben-
eficiaries who rely on that summary are not accurately apprised of
their rights. But when a beneficiary fails to read or rely on the sum-
mary, . . . the beneficiary also prevents full apprisal of the rights
under the plan. Beneficiaries must do their part if Congress' objec-
tive is to be met. We thus hold that, to prevent an employer from
enforcing the terms of a plan that are inconsistent with those of the
plan summary, a beneficiary must prove reliance on the
summary. 189
182. Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. Among other things, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168, requires companies to offer their employees the option of
continuing their health insurance coverage after leaving employment. Here, as required by CO-
BRA, the G. Bernd company plan offered employees the option to continue their health insur-
ance coverage at their own expense for eighteen months following the termination of their
employment. Branch, 955 F.2d at 1576.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1577.
187. Id. at 1577-78.
188. Branch, 955 F.2d at 1578 (citing Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903, 907-08 (2d Cir.
1990)).
189. Id. at 1579.
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In Branch, the court found no reliance because there was no evidence
the decedent ever read or relied on the summary.190
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES
In Murphy Oil USA, Inc., the Fifth Circuit stated that on three pre-
vious occasions it had declined to address whether an ERISA claim-
ant needed to show reliance on the conflicting terms of an SPD to
prevail on a claim for benefits. 191 The court's avoidance of this diffi-
cult issue is hardly surprising in light of the confused body of case law
and lack of Supreme Court guidance on the issue.192
To facilitate analysis, this Article has attempted to group the ex-
isting body of case law into the five distinct levels of proof described
by Murphy Oil USA, Inc. However, as shown in the previous section,
the courts' incredibly varied approaches to the law create a large num-
ber of possible outcomes-from strict liability for an incorrect SPD to
a required demonstration of detrimental reliance.
The legislative history of ERISA reveals that Congress empowered
the federal courts to create federal common law to govern issues in
ERISA not covered by the act itself.1 93 Indeed, the United States Su-
preme Court has stated "[t]he expectations that a federal common law
of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans would develop
... would make little sense if the remedies available to ERISA partici-
pants and beneficiaries under § 502(a) could be supplemented or sup-
planted by varying state laws. ' 194 Although the law regarding conflicts
between plans and SPDs is governed by federal law, the patchwork of
varying circuit laws has created the effect Congress wanted to avoid-
the unpredictability and inconsistency that accompanies different
rules for different jurisdictions, particularly for employers that operate
in multiple geographic regions but deliver employee benefits through
a single plan.
190. Id. at 1580.
191. Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2007).
192. Id. at 548, n.1.
193. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1988) (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Javits) ("a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans")). The
United States Supreme Court and several appellate courts have recognized this authority as
validating the use of federal common law. See Jamail, Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Hous-
ton Pension & Welfare Trusts, 954 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Both the legislative history and
the case law pursuant to ERISA validate our application of federal common law to ERISA.");
Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Federal courts possess the au-
thority, however, to develop a body of federal common law to govern issues in ERISA actions
not covered by the act itself.").
194. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
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Congress designed ERISA to serve a number of interrelated goals
including: equity for employees, transparency and accountability in
the operation of benefit plans, and increased financial security for re-
tirees and their families. 195 The five-way circuit split interferes with
each of these goals because it further complicates the byzantine world
of pension and welfare benefits and produces unequal results, with
outcomes depending on the jurisdiction of a company's incorporation.
Neither plan documents nor SPDs are models of simplicity, 196 and
their sometimes impenetrable nature is further compounded by the
lack of common standards for handling the seemingly inevitable need
to resolve conflicts between them.197
The Supreme Court's intervention to decide the appropriate stan-
dard of reliance and/or prejudice which ERISA claimants must
demonstrate in order to benefit from favorable SPD terms would set-
tle the debate among the circuits and provide much-needed guidance
for attorneys. Perhaps no standard is flawless, but the approach of the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits-requiring a beneficiary to prove reli-
ance on an SPD before he may benefit from advantageous terms in an
SPD-yields fair results and is in line with ERISA's statutory scheme.
As such, this Article proposes the Supreme Court adopt this reliance
standard.
A. No Reliance: A Strict Liability Standard
The Fifth, Third, and Sixth Circuits do not require a showing of reli-
ance.198 The principal justification for this standard is that it conforms
to the remedial goals of ERISA and protects the interests of the in-
jured employee(s).
ERISA does not come into play until a private employer voluntarily
decides to establish an ERISA plan. Congress had multiple goals in
enacting ERISA, one of which was to encourage employers to provide
benefit plans for employees and to enhance the benefits provided
195. See generally Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 20.
196. "[Tlhe effect of drafting plan documents explicitly to grant interpretive discretion to de-
cision makers has come to be a complex amalgam of shield and sword." Dana M. Muir, Fiduci-
ary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 391, 412 (2000).
197. "[A] document written to be understood by the average participant cannot be completely
accurate and comprehensive; it need be only reasonably so, in recognition of the fact that gener-
alizations and simplifications are necessary to make the SPD intelligible (and therefore useful)
to the intended audience." WIEDENBECK, supra note 4, at 82.
198. Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2007); Burstein v.
Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found., 334 F.3d 365,
380-82 (3d Cir. 2003); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir.
1988).
2009]
546 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
under those plans. Employers will not provide these benefits if the
costs become prohibitive due to unfavorable court rulings. Further-
more, courts should be concerned with the solvency of plans and avoid
giving windfalls to undeserving beneficiaries.
Thus, the strict liability approach suggested by the Fifth Circuit in
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. could actually hinder ERISA's goal of in-
creased financial security for retirees and their families because em-
ployers may decide against organizing and maintaining benefit plans if
the legal risk becomes too great. This approach also does not serve the
equity goal, as windfalls to employees who have not even read their
company's SPD can drain limited company reserves, leading to in-
creased costs for employers and insurers, which then jeopardizes the
solvency of the plan for all employees.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit approach is overbroad. When the
SPD terms conflict with the Plan, the SPD terms control and bind the
company. This approach does not limit the scope of what constitutes a
contradiction. Thus, a specific contradiction, a self-contradiction
within an SPD, or an incomplete SPD can all potentially give rise to
liability. This, in turn, could discourage companies from providing
benefit plans in the first place.
The Third Circuit, in Burstein, utilized common law contract princi-
ples as the basis for its no-reliance standard. However, this approach
overlooks the fact that ERISA benefit plans are fundamentally differ-
ent than common law contracts. Contracts require an offer, an accept-
ance, and some sort of bargained-for consideration. No bargaining is
involved when one signs up for an employer-provided benefit plan.
Employees cannot bargain with plan administrators to receive better
benefits than other plan participants. 199 Furthermore, a contract gen-
erally represents terms to which parties have agreed. An SPD is sim-
ply designed to inform employees of their rights under a plan-the
creation of which has been incentivized by the federal government
through beneficial tax treatment. Finally, violating a contract will
never result in criminal liability. However, criminal penalties are avail-
able under ERISA for any person who willfully violates any provision
of Part 1 of Title 1.200 In sum, this approach ignores important policy
differences between contract law and ERISA.
199. Alternatively, one could also argue that an employee automatically agrees to the terms of
the Plan Document when he or she signs their offer of employment; therefore, employees have
already agreed to the terms of the contract, the Plan Document, prior to litigation.
200. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT LAW GUIDE: EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLAN available at http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/erisa.htm (Sept. 2005).
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The Sixth Circuit's decision in Edwards is, as the dissenting opinion
noted, a "classic example of the maxim that hard cases make bad
law."201 The case involved a forty-year-old long time employee who
underwent a procedure to remove a brain tumor and was specifically
informed he would qualify for disability income. The plaintiff in the
case was undeniably misled by the SPD. He detrimentally relied upon
the summary's language, a reassuring letter, and a report of his ac-
crued employment service. However, the Sixth Circuit stated that pre-
cedent did not dictate that a claimant who has been misled by
summary descriptions must prove detrimental reliance.20 2
This holding went too far. The facts of Edwards did not require such
a broad decision. Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's argument, existing
precedent did not dictate that a claimant must prove detrimental reli-
ance because the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
matter and the circuits are split on the issue.
Under the proposed reliance standard, the approach of the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits, a plaintiff like Edwards-who detrimentally re-
lied on the summaries provided to him-is exactly the type of claim-
ant who would recover. Thus, unfairness to employees will not result
under the proposed rule because those who detrimentally rely will
have a cause of action. Those not detrimentally relying on summary
plans should not be allowed to drain limited company reserves, which
they did not reasonably believe themselves entitled to in the first
place. There is no need for the Sixth Circuit's standard and, indeed,
the court has begun to back away from the no-reliance standard.20 3
B. Vague Middle Ground Standards
On the spectrum of approaches courts have taken, the likelihood of
prejudice standard, the reliance or prejudice standard, and the reli-
ance or prejudice but only if the SPD is "faulty" standard, all seem to
be vague middle grounds. Each is discussed below.
201. Edwards, 851 F.2d at 137.
202. Id.
203. Recently, the Sixth Circuit decided Zirnhelt v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 526 F.3d 282 (6th
Cir. 2008). In Zirnhelt, a former plan participant did not receive a copy of the SPD until after she
filed her complaint seeking pension benefits. Id. at 285. In dicta, the Sixth Circuit noted that if
there is a conflict between the SPD and plan, the plan controls unless the participant can show
he or she reasonably relied on the SPD. Id. at 287-88. However, as noted above, previous Sixth
Circuit authority explicitly and specifically endorses the idea that showing reliance is not neces-
sary. See Edwards, 851 F.2d at 137. As of the time this Article was written, it remains to be seen
what, if any, effect Zirnhelt will have on the Sixth Circuit.
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1. The Likelihood of Prejudice Standard
The Second Circuit does not require a showing of reliance but re-
quires a claimant to demonstrate a likelihood of prejudice from a con-
tradiction, which can be rebutted by evidence showing the error was
harmless.20 4 The Second Circuit's approach, as applied in Burke v. Ko-
dak Retirement Income Plan seems unworkable. First, it is unclear
from the court's decision what constitutes a contradiction. In Burke
(unlike Murphy Oil USA, Inc.), there was not an explicit contradic-
tion. Instead, a requirement-which was present in sixteen other sec-
tions of the summary and communicated to employees via other
corporate literature-was omitted in one particular section.
ERISA was not designed to protect employees who failed to fully
inform themselves of their rights and benefits. ERISA merely pro-
vides the structure to which employee benefit plans should adhere. By
definition, a summary plan description contains less information than
a plan document because it is just that-a summary. It cannot, and
should not, contain all of the same information that is in the plan doc-
ument, only enough important information to reasonably apprise plan
participants of their rights and benefits.
Second, the Burke court leaves district courts grappling with the
hazy concept of what constitutes a showing of a likelihood of
prejudice. The plaintiffs in Burke were likely put on notice that, as
domestic partners for eight years, they should have filed a joint affida-
vit; this was communicated in sixteen separate summary sections and
through other corporate literature. While corporate literature may not
cure a deficient SPD, it is certainly not readily apparent that there was
a likelihood of prejudice in this case.
Finally, if employees are allowed to ignore an SPD and company
literature, and later take advantage of a company's auspicious mis-
take, the SPD's function as the primary means by which employees
are apprised of their benefits is not served. This also would not en-
courage employers to develop ERISA benefits plans. Courts should
not reward decisions such as those made by the plaintiff in Burke-
conscious decisions to not apply for domestic partnership for eight
years, ignoring the SPD completely, and only then attempting to seek
survivor income benefits on the fortuitous ground that there was an
inconsistency between the SPD and SIB. A claimant like this (who
chooses to bury their head in the sand) would not recover under the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' reliance approach.
204. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2003).
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2. The Reliance or Prejudice Standard
The First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized the inherent
unfairness of a per se rule that resolves ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies in favor of the employee in every situation. The problem with the
First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuit approaches is that their standards al-
low for either reliance or prejudice. These courts' holdings are seem-
ingly inconsistent with their reasoning. They reason for a reliance
standard (which assumes prejudice like the Seventh and Eleventh Cir-
cuits), citing concerns of windfalls, fairness, notice, and very little det-
riment, but then conclude by allowing a showing of reliance or
prejudice.
Prejudice is defined as damage or detriment to a claimant's legal
rights or claims.205 Requiring reliance and prejudice is redundant; why
would a person bring a lawsuit if his rights were not damaged? Simply
bringing a claim to point out an inconsistency between an SPD and a
Plan Document makes little sense unless a person is actually seeking
relief for a perceived harm.
This holding is confusing, redundant, and leaves the door open for
meritless claims of an inconsistency between an SPD and a Plan Doc-
ument. The approach of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, requiring
detrimental reliance, is superior to the aforementioned reliance or
prejudice standard.
3. The Reliance or Prejudice but only if the SPD is
"Faulty" Standard
The Eighth Circuit requires a showing of reliance or prejudice, but
only if the SPD is "faulty. ' 20 6 The Eighth Circuit's decision is confus-
ing. Although the court purportedly takes the approach to avoid
sandbagging ERISA claimants, ERISA claimants may not even know
if the SPDs they receive are "faulty." Many, if not most, claimants do
not know until the time of litigation whether the SPD they received
meets the formal requirements of ERISA.
A "faulty" SPD requires a showing of reliance or prejudice whereas
a non-faulty SPD does not. Thus, the approach shoulders an ERISA
claimant with an even more difficult burden because it requires a
claimant provided with a confusing and inadequate SPD to prove
even more-reliance or prejudice-than a claimant provided with an
205. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
206. Palmisano v. Allina Health Sys., 190 F.3d 881, 887-88 (8th Cir. 1999); Marolt v. Alliant
Techsystems, 146 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972
F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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SPD meeting all ERISA requirements. In effect, this standard is more
lenient to employers who write faulty SPDs than it is to employers
who comply with ERISA's formal SPD requirements.
The application of Marolt in Palmisano particularly demonstrates
the peculiarity of the Eighth Circuit's approach. The refusal to "sand-
bag" 207 ERISA claimants is grounded in the theory that SPDs are an
essential component of ERISA's reporting and disclosure require-
ments and when SPD provisions conflict with formal plan provisions,
then the SPD provisions should prevail as a matter of law.20 8 The
Eighth Circuit's approach allows a claimant like the plaintiff in Marolt
(who did not read the SPD) to rely on it as a matter of law. However,
to obtain relief when a faulty SPD conflicts with the plan document, a
participant must show reliance.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's approach places additional burdens on
claimants who have placed their faith in a faulty SPD: they must also
prove reliance on, or prejudice from, the summary and that the plan
summary was in fact a faulty SPD, not just a grossly inaccurate or
misleading document provided by an employer. The claimant in
Palmisano could not recover because the plan's summary was too in-
adequate to be considered an SPD.
However, it remains unclear whether failing to include specific ER-
ISA requirements or a certain number of ERISA requirements can
turn a non-faulty SPD into a faulty one. In its attempt to avoid benefit
plan interpretations concocted for purposes of litigation, the Eighth
Circuit seems to have saddled claimants with inadequate and unequal
protection. These anomalous results do not serve the purpose of ER-
ISA as this approach does not encourage employees to take action to
inform themselves of their rights and benefits.
C. Reliance Required: A Fair Standard to Plan Participants
and Employers
Approaching ERISA as a statute designed solely to protect employ-
ees at the expense of employers is narrow-minded given Congress's
multiple objectives in developing ERISA. The statute's preemption of
state law claims,20 9 removal to federal court,210 and the aforemen-
207. Marolt, 146 F.3d at 620.
208. Palmisano, 190 F.3d at 887.
209. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997).
210. Removal to federal court is important because the trier of fact is now a U.S. District
Judge, as opposed to a state court jury (which commentators have suggested would be more
favorable to a claimant). Additionally, more restrictive federal common law will be applied as
opposed to the more expansive state common law.
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tioned limited remedies available under ERISA reveal the drafters'
intent-and the Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional in-
tent-to create a statute which is not so unfavorable to employers as
to prevent them from developing ERISA benefit plans for their em-
ployees. Benefit plans are just that-benefits for employees-and thus
a primary goal is to encourage employers to develop these plans.
By not requiring proof of reliance on a favorable SPD term, the
SPD term is in effect converted into a "plan term," which is enforcea-
ble as a claim for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 211 As ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) is one of the three main avenues for relief, changing a
faulty SPD term into a "plan term" (which is enforceable as a claim
for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA) gives claimants an easier
avenue for relief not found in the legislative history of ERISA. This
approach is incongruent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
congressional intent.212 Since ERISA benefit plans are not a statutory
requirement, 213 employers may shirk this practice if losing every ER-
ISA employee benefit plan lawsuit became the norm. Moreover, the
plan fiduciary has a legal duty, subject to personal liability should
there be a breach, to follow the terms of the "documents and instru-
ments governing the plan," the plan document. 214 There is no legal
obligation under ERISA, the regulations, or any Supreme Court case
to follow the SPD's terms.
The Seventh 215 and Eleventh 216 Circuits' approach, which requires a
showing of reliance, is the most logical and faithful way to meet the
goals of ERISA. The rule of these circuits is that when a plan docu-
ment and SPD conflict, the former governs because it is more com-
plete and the SPD has excerpted and translated the former into
language designed to be intelligible to lay persons. This is true unless a
plan participant or beneficiary has reasonably relied on the SPD to his
detriment.
211. Wilkins v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund, 445 F.3d 572, 582-83, 585-86 (2d
Cir. 2006) (holding a deficient SPD can give rise to claim for benefits under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B)).
212. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985), emphasizing the
Court's unwillingness to infer causes of action in the ERISA context because the statute's care-
fully designed and detailed enforcement scheme provided "strong evidence that Congress did
not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." Id. at 146.
213. ERISA § 2; 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2008).
214. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
215. Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mers
v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1022-24 (7th
Cir. 1998)).
216. Branch v. G. Bernd Co, 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992).
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The Seventh Circuit further distinguishes SPDs which clarify, rather
than contradict, the plan from SPDs which are silent on issues.2 17 This
approach is logical as SPDs would no longer be a summary if the sum-
mary plan description restated every part of the plan document. More-
over, clarification of a benefit in an SPD is directly in line with ERISA
and the federal government's goal in requiring an SPD in the first
place. As the primary source by which an employee is apprised of his
benefits, the document should be comprehensible to the employees
who will be reading it. It follows that employees are certainly entitled
to rely on the SPD, but when they have not relied, they should not be
entitled to cry foul. Any other approach does not serve ERISA's pur-
pose for providing employees with an SPD and does not further ER-
ISA's goals.
Employers and insurers rely on benefit plans, not the SPD, to pro-
vide benefits and coverage. Failing to require reliance on an SPD al-
lows a windfall for employees lucky enough to find a pertinent
inconsistency between the SPD and the plan document and unjustly
increases the cost of administering benefit plans for employers and
insurers. This ultimately jeopardizes the solvency of the plan which
affects all employees. For this reason, while employees may rely on
SPDs, they should not be allowed to recover based on a conflicting or
faulty term in an SPD without first proving that they relied on the
provision.
V. CONCLUSION
The spectrum of circuit court case law is broad on the question of
what the appropriate standard of reliance should be for a plan partici-
pant to successfully bring suit when an SPD conflicts with the terms of
the underlying plan document. The amorphous requirements estab-
lished by the circuit courts underscore the need for a higher author-
ity-the Supreme Court or Congress-to step in and settle the debate.
This Article advocates for a standard which requires beneficiaries to
prove reliance on an SPD before benefiting from SPD terms that con-
217. Mers, 144 F.3d at 1023. "[Prior precedent] suggests that the terms of an SPD control over
the terms of the underlying document if any discrepancy exists between them.... The Williams
court found that a discrepancy exists when a definition provided only in the plan of a term used
in the SPD is inconsistent with the common meaning of the term.... This interpretation of our
precedent is not entirely accurate. We allow a participant or beneficiary to rely on the SPD and
estop the plan administrator from denying coverage because of terms not included in the SPD
only if there is a direct conflict between the SPD and the underlying policy." Id. (emphasis added)
(citing Williams v. Midwest Operating Eng'rs Welfare Fund, 125 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 (7th Cir.
1997); Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991); Fuller v.
CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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flict with the corresponding plan document. Congress's goals in re-
quiring the SPD-transparency and accountability in the operation of
benefit plans-are not furthered by allowing employees who did not
detrimentally rely on the SPD to benefit from the SPD. Balancing the
relative hardships, it is fairer to require plan participants to actually
read and rely on the SPD before benefiting from it than it is to require
employers to be strictly liable for every contradiction or omission in
the SPD. Utilizing a form of strict liability when SPD terms differ
from plan terms may discourage employers from forming benefit
plans for fear of massive liability or even jeopardize the solvency of
the plan to the detriment of all of the plan participants. Due to the
millions of workers and the trillions of dollars in assets potentially in-
volved, it is paramount for the Supreme Court or Congress to restore
order and bring predictability to this otherwise ambiguous body of
case law.

